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Abstract 
Recent evidence suggests that Americans underestimate wealth inequality in the United States 
and favor a more equal wealth distribution (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Does this pattern reflect 
ideological dynamics unique to the United States, or is the phenomenon evident in other 
developed economies – such as Australia? We assessed Australians’ perceived and ideal wealth 
distributions and compared them to the actual wealth distribution. Although the United States 
and Australia differ in the degree of actual wealth inequality and in cultural narratives around 
economic mobility, the Australian data closely replicated the United States findings. 
Misperceptions of wealth inequality as well as preferences for more equal distributions may be 
common across developed economies. In addition, beliefs about wealth distribution only weakly 
predicted support for raising the minimum wage, suggesting that attitudes toward inequality may 
not translate into preferences for redistributive policies.  
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The Not-So-Common-Wealth of Australia:  
Evidence for a Cross-Cultural Desire for a More Equal Distribution of Wealth 
Just how much richer should the rich be than the poor and middle class? The recent rise 
of the worldwide “Occupy” movement – in countries ranging from Armenia to Denmark and 
Nigeria to Hong Kong –  suggests a broad (and increasing) international concern with the size of 
the gap between the rich and poor. Recent research suggests that most Americans favor a far 
more equal wealth distribution than they perceive currently to exist (Norton & Ariely, 2011). We 
present data from a national survey in Australia that allows us to explore similarities and 
differences in how Americans and Australians (each of whom had their own Occupy movement) 
perceive the current gap between rich and poor – as well as their ideal desires for the size of that 
gap. We also examine how these beliefs about inequality relate to preferences for policies that 
might affect that inequality, such as increases in the minimum wage. 
Understanding wealth and income inequality is important from both an economic and a 
psychological perspective. Recent economic modeling suggests that sharp increases in wealth 
inequality can play a role in triggering large-scale financial crises. Noting a historical trend 
whereby major recessions over the last century have been preceded by increases in wealth 
inequality, Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) argue that rising wealth inequality fosters increased 
borrowing among the poor, which increases leverage and leaves societies vulnerable to the 
possibility of an economic crisis. Wealth inequality can also contribute to negative health and 
social outcomes, with research suggesting that highly unequal societies tend to be characterized 
by higher levels of obesity and drug abuse, higher levels of crime, lower levels of educational 
attainment and overall poorer psychological wellbeing (Napier & Jost, 2008; Pickett & 
Wilkinson, 2010; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).  
Inequality in the United States and Australia 
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In a nationally representative survey, Norton and Ariely (2011) found that US 
respondents estimated that the richest 20% of the population owns around 59% of total wealth, 
but believed that this richest quintile should ideally own just 32%. In reality, however, the 
richest 20% owns closer to 84% of total wealth. Thus, despite strong cultural themes of 
economic mobility and rewarding individual enterprise, Americans favor greater wealth equality, 
even relative to their erroneously small estimates of the gap between rich and poor. Interestingly, 
Norton and Ariely (2011) found that this pattern transcended political identification; with 
liberals and conservatives alike underestimating the wealth gap and favoring a more equal 
distribution.  
But are these dynamics driven by conditions that are unique to the US? Australia 
provides an interesting comparison point. According to government data, the richest 20% of 
Australians own 62% of the nation’s wealth, while the poorest 20% hold less than 1% (ABS, 
2011). This disparity has been on an upward trajectory over the past decade, with the top quintile 
increasing their share of the wealth by 3 percentage points since 2003-04 (ABS, 2006). 
However, wealth inequality has increased far more rapidly in the US than in Australia in recent 
decades. OECD data shows that, between the mid-1980s and the late 2000s, the gap between the 
richest 10% Americans and the poorest 10% grew by a factor of fifteen, whereas in Australia, 
the divide only increased by a factor of 1.5 (OECD, 2011). Thus, Norton and Ariely’s (2011) 
findings may, in part, reflect that public perceptions in the US have not kept pace with an 
exceptionally rapid rate of change, but have still exceeded a critical threshold where most people 
now favor greater equality. If so, the dynamics observed in the US may not generalize to other 
developed countries – like Australia – where the wealth gap is both somewhat smaller and has 
been growing at a slower pace.  
The purpose of the current study was to extend upon Norton and Ariely’s (2011) work by 
exploring how Australians view wealth inequality, by seeking to answer four key questions. Are 
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Australians accurate in their estimates of how wealth is distributed throughout the country, or, 
like Norton and Ariely’s US sample, do they perceive the gap between the rich and poor to be 
smaller than is actually the case? Regardless of their perceptions, in what kind of society would 
they ideally like to live?  Do people’s perceptions of the “ideal society” differ as a function of 
personal wealth and political ideology? Finally, in a novel direction not explored by Norton and 
Ariely (2011), how are perceptions of wealth inequality related to attitudes towards policies – 
such as the minimum wage – that have the potential to alter wealth inequality?  
Method 
Respondents  
We surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Australian adults, recruited 
through a research-only panel. Two respondents failed to provide demographic information, 
leading to a final sample of 998. The sample was matched to the demographics of the broader 
Australian population, with quotas specified for gender, age, employment status, state/territory, 
and metro/regional residence. All respondents completed the survey over a ten-day period in 
March 2011. A demographic profile of respondents can be found in Table 1.  
Materials and Procedure 
Perceptions of ideal and actual wealth distributions  
 The first task asked respondents to think of Australian households as divided into five 
quintiles, ranging from the richest to the poorest, with each group comprising 20% of the 
households. To gauge Australians’ estimates of the actual distribution of wealth, we asked 
respondents to indicate what percent of Australians’ total wealth was owned by each of the 
quintiles (with the total percent across all five groups summing to 100%). We defined “wealth” 
as the sum of all major assets owned in a household (e.g., car, house, shares, superannuation, 
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cash, etc.) minus any debts (e.g., mortgage, car loans, etc.) to ensure all respondents approached 
the task in the same manner.  
After indicating how they thought Australians’ wealth was distributed, we asked 
respondents how they thought wealth ideally should be divided up among the quintiles; 
respondents again provided percentages for each of the quintiles. This methodology has been 
successfully used in prior research (Norton & Ariely, 2011). 
Preferences for different societies 
In a second task, respondents were presented with three different pie charts, each 
representing the wealth distribution of three hypothetical countries, labeled Country A, Country 
B, and Country C (Figure r3a). In reality, these pie graphs represented (A) the actual wealth 
distribution in Australia, taken from ABS data from 2005-2006 (ABS, 2007),1 (B) the ideal 
distribution of wealth in the US as reported by a nationally representative sample (Norton and 
Ariely, 2011), and (C) a society in which there was a perfectly equal distribution of wealth. Each 
pie chart was split into five quintiles, with the size of each quintile reflecting the amount of 
wealth owned by that particular quintile. For each pie chart, respondents were asked to indicate 
how much they would like to live in that particular country, on a scale from 0 (definitely 
wouldn’t like it) to 100 (definitely would like it). In making their decision, respondents were 
given a “Rawlsian veil of ignorance” by being told to imagine that if they joined any of the 
nations, they would be randomly placed in one of the quintiles, and so would have the same 
chance of ending up in any one group, from the richest to the poorest (Rawls, 1971). As in 
Norton and Ariely (2011), respondents were not trained on the pie chart task. 
After indicating these ratings, respondents were presented with two more pie charts – 
Country A and Country B (Figure 3b). These charts represented (A) Australia’s actual wealth 
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distribution, and (B) America’s actual wealth distribution. Again, respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they would like to live in each country.  
Perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the minimum wage 
 Next, respondents were probed on their perceptions and attitudes towards the minimum 
wage. After being provided with a working definition of the minimum wage – “the lowest hourly 
or weekly wage that employers may legally pay to employees or workers” – respondents were 
asked to estimate the current adult national minimum wage in Australia per hour, on a scale 
ranging from AUD$0 to AUD$40. Second, we assessed attitudes towards increasing the 
minimum wage, using a 7-point scale (strongly oppose increasing to strongly support 
increasing). Finally, respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with the following 
statement: “Government should adopt policies that promote wealth equality in Australia”, using 
a 7-point scale (disagree strongly to agree strongly).  
Respondent demographics  
 Last, we obtained demographic information from respondents including political 
affiliation, their personal wealth, education, marital status, employment, gender, metro/regional 
residence, and age. In calculating personal wealth, we gave respondents a working definition that 
provided details on how to sum their assets and subtract their debts.  
Results  
Perceptions of ideal and actual wealth distributions within society 
 Figure 1 presents respondents’ perceived actual distribution and perceived ideal 
distributions across all five quintiles.2 It also shows the actual wealth distribution across quintiles 
in Australia at the time of testing (ABS, 2011).   
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 First, Australians vastly underestimated the degree of wealth inequality in society. This 
was especially evident in their estimates of the poorest and wealthiest quintiles, with Australians 
overestimating the wealth of the poorest quintile by a factor of more than seven, and 
underestimating the wealth of the wealthiest quintile by more than a fifth. These findings mirror 
those of Norton and Ariely (2011), suggesting that Australians also perceive less of gap between 
the rich and poor than is the case.  
Second, these findings suggest that Australians prefer a society that is even more equal 
than they erroneously believe it to be, reporting a desire for the wealthiest quintile to own just 
over a third of the nation’s wealth (34%), and far less than what they own in reality (62%). This 
pattern of findings closely matches Norton and Ariely’s (2011) US data.     
 We next explored whether respondents’ own personal wealth levels and their political 
affiliation affected their estimates and ideal distributions. First, we segmented respondents into 
one of the five quintiles based on their personal wealth. Similar to the findings reported by 
Norton and Ariely (2011), ideal distributions were also remarkably stable across all levels of 
wealth, indicating that Australians hold a strikingly similar view of what their country should 
look like. 
 Second, we explored how estimates and ideal distributions differed according to 
respondents’ political orientation.  For ease of interpretation, we collapsed political affiliation 
into three groups: (1) ALP/Greens/Democrats (i.e., left leaning voters); (2) Liberal 
Party/National Party (i.e., right leaning voters); and (3) Unaffiliated/Family First/Other.3 As with 
personal wealth, there was little variation across the groups.  Regardless of their political 
inclinations, respondents displayed a strong preference for living in a society that is more equal 
than is currently the case in Australia.  
Preferences for different societies 
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 To examine relative preferences for living in the different hypothetical countries, we took 
each respondents’ rating for each distribution (ranging from 0 to 100), and calculated their 
preferred distribution across each possible pairing of countries. For instance, a respondent who 
gave Country A a score of 80 and Country B a score of 50 was coded as having a preference for 
Country A. From this we determined the percentage of respondents who preferred one country 
over another. Figure 3a and 3b display these relative preferences, suggesting that Australians 
strongly favor societies that are more equal. Compared to the society in which, unbeknownst to 
them, they actually lived, almost three-quarters of Australians preferred a society with only a 
small degree of inequality, and two-thirds preferred a society that was fully equal. The society in 
which respondents actually lived was more appealing than an even more unequal society (the 
US), with two-thirds of respondents preferring Australia’s distribution over the US distribution 
(Figure 3b).  
Perceptions of and attitudes towards policy changes 
 We next examined Australians’ estimates of – and attitudes towards – the minimum 
wage. Just as respondents overestimated the percent of wealth owned by the poorest quintile, 
they also overestimated the minimum wage, with their estimated mean of AUD$16.80/hour 
nearly AUD$2.00 more than the actual national adult minimum wage at the time of survey 
(AUD$15.00/hour).  We also segmented the sample according to party identification, gender and 
age. As Table 2 shows, this overestimation of the minimum wage emerged across all 
demographic variables. However, the extent of overestimation varied depending on certain 
demographics. For instance, females gave more accurate estimates of the minimum wage than 
did males, t(996) = 2.07, p=.039. A linear regression analysis revealed that respondents’ 
personal income predicted their estimates of the minimum wage, B=.11, SE=.05, t(985) = 3.44, 
p=.001, with lower income respondents predicting significantly lower levels than higher income 
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respondents.4 Personal wealth also marginally predicted minimum wage estimates, B=.06, 
SE=.04, t(994) = 1.88, p=.061.  
 Despite their generally inflated estimates of the minimum wage, our results suggest that 
Australians were strongly supportive of further increases (mean=5.73 on 7-point scale). Table 2 
presents ratings across the demographic variables, showing high levels of support for increasing 
the minimum wage across all key demographics. However, again there were some notable 
differences. Support was significantly stronger among females than males, t(996) = -5.31, 
p<.001. Further, support significantly varied as a function of political affiliation, F(2,992) = 
14.41, p<.001, with simple contrasts revealing that those who identified with the ALP, Greens, 
or Democrats, showed stronger support for increasing the minimum wage than unaffiliated 
respondents, t(992) = 2.37, p=.018, who in turn were more supportive than Liberal and National 
Party respondents, t(992) = 3.46, p=.001. Finally, linear regression demonstrated that as 
respondents’ wealth increased, their support for increasing the minimum wage declined, B=-.05, 
SE=.01, t(994) = 4.26, p<.001.   
We next examined support for government intervention in addressing wealth inequality. 
While support was not as strong as for increasing the minimum wage, overall there was some 
support across the sample for government intervention in policies that increase wealth equality  
(mean=4.98 on a 7-point scale). However, this significantly differed according to political 
affiliation, F(2,992) = 47.66, p<.001 (see Table 2). As simple contrasts reveal, respondents who 
identified with the ALP, Democrats or Greens showed significantly greater support than 
unaffiliated respondents, t(992) = 5.22, p<.001, who in turn showed significantly more support 
than respondents affiliated with the Liberal or National Party, t(992) = 5.47, p<.001. However, 
even the lowest scores were above the midpoint, indicating that conservative, liberal, and 
independent voters still endorse government intervention on the issue. 
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Thus despite some differences, respondents expressed considerable support overall for 
raising the minimum wage and other government intervention, suggesting that regardless of 
political ideology, gender, or personal wealth, Australians would like a society in which the poor 
are better off.  
Relationships between estimated and ideal inequality and policy preferences 
We next examined how people’s estimates of the wealth distribution in Australia – and 
their ideal distributions – were related to their attitudes towards increasing the minimum wage 
and government intervention. Attitudes towards a minimum wage increase were not related to 
how much wealth respondents actually perceived the bottom quintile to own, r(995)=-.04, p=.20. 
Attitudes were only very weakly related to how much wealth they believed the bottom quintile 
should own, r(995)=.12, p<.001. Further, attitudes towards increasing the minimum wage were 
only weakly correlated with the difference between respondents’ actual and ideal distribution for 
this quintile, r(995)=.11, p=.001. In other words, a belief that the bottom quintile has much less 
wealth than they should ideally have only weakly predicted more positive attitudes towards 
increasing the minimum wage. Overall, these results suggest that people’s views about how 
much wealth the poorest quintile should own are not closely tied to their attitudes towards 
raising the minimum wage.  
We also examined how respondents’ estimates and ideal wealth distributions related to 
their agreement/disagreement with the statement, “Government should adopt policies that 
promote wealth equality in Australia.”  Respondents’ support for this statement was not 
correlated with how much wealth they estimated the poorest quintile to have, r(995)=-.05, p=.08, 
and was weakly associated with how much wealth they believed that the poorest quintile should 
have, r(995)=.21, p<.001. As with the minimum wage, given that these correlations were 
consistently either weak or non-significant, Australians’ beliefs about wealth distribution 
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evidently are not closely aligned with their attitudes towards wealth-equalizing government 
policies. 
Discussion 
 Using a nationally representative Australian sample, the present study replicates the 
primary findings of Norton and Ariely (2011), thereby demonstrating that those earlier findings 
are not driven by ideological or economic conditions unique to the US. As in the US study, 
Australians perceived far less of a gap between the rich and the poor than actually exists. This 
tendency emerged even when people made estimates for the wealth quintile to which they 
themselves belonged, suggesting that the rich systematically underestimate their share of the 
wealth, and the poor systematically overestimate theirs.  
 As in the US, despite underestimating the extent of wealth inequality, Australians favor a 
society that is even more equal than their optimistic misperception, preferring a society in which 
wealth inequality does not exist (i.e., all quintiles own the same) to their own society by a 
margin of two to one. This preference for greater equality was also present in Norton and 
Ariely’s (2011) US sample, although not to the same extent. Notably, in line with Norton and 
Ariely (2011), ideal and actual estimates of wealth distribution were strikingly similar regardless 
of personal wealth and political affiliation, suggesting that all Australians tend to favor a society 
that is more equal than it is at present. One potential alternative explanation for our results is that 
they may be driven in part by desires to appear “politically correct” by stating one’s belief in 
equality (e.g., Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). However, we note that 
respondents in previous research often report less-than-politically-correct beliefs; for example, 
whereas liberals view poverty as the result of injustice, conservatives blame poverty on self-
indulgence and moral failings (e.g., Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock, & Brady, 1986), and White 
Americans now report that Whites are greater victims of racial discrimination than Blacks 
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(Norton & Sommers, 2011). Still, future research is needed to explore the extent to which 
concerns about political correctness may influence our results. 
 Do these beliefs about wealth inequality translate to support for redistributionist policy 
mechanisms, such as the minimum wage? Our results suggest the link is weak. Although 
Australians generally favored an increase in the current minimum wage, support was only 
weakly correlated with beliefs that the poorest quintile should ideally have more wealth than 
they currently do. Similarly, the correlation between the belief that the poorest quintile should 
have more of the wealth and support for policies that increase wealth equality were also fairly 
weak. Overall, this suggests that preferences for a more equal society do not clearly map onto 
support for policy actions that will effect such change, in line with other research suggesting a 
disconnect between citizens’ general political beliefs and their attitudes towards specific policies 
(e.g., Bartels, 2005).  
On the one hand, this weak relationship may be driven by the fact that people 
systematically overestimate the actual wealth of the poorest in society. This misperception may 
work to decouple people’s beliefs about ideal wealth distributions from their beliefs about policy 
mechanisms—effectively making people feel like the problem is less urgent than they may 
otherwise feel. Accordingly, future research might address whether informing people about 
actual wealth disparities strengthens the link between their personal ideal society and their 
support for policy mechanisms that address wealth inequality; previous research does suggest 
that such perceptions are malleable (e.g., Chow & Galak, 2012; Savani & Rattan, 2012).  On the 
other hand, the weak relationship may be driven by the fact that people do not perceive the 
minimum wage as an effective tool for addressing wealth inequality. If this is the case, 
enhancing accuracy of wealth distribution estimates will have little impact on support for such 
policies that reduce inequality. In this scenario, alternative policy mechanisms, such as 
Running head: THE NOT-SO-COMMON-WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 14 
 
strengthening progressive taxation, may provide more fruitful avenues for closing the gap 
between ideal and actual wealth distributions.  
Conclusion 
 Differences in the distribution of outcomes among citizens underlie many of the most 
pressing political issues: Should all citizens receive universal health care? Should affirmative 
action policies be discontinued or preserved? Should everyone pay the same income tax, or 
should some pay more than others? Not surprisingly, such questions prompt heated debates 
within individual countries, with members of different political parties often holding 
diametrically opposed views. The current results demonstrating Australians’ consensus desire 
for a more equal Australia – taken together with Norton and Ariely’s (2011) results suggesting a 
similar desire among Americans for a more equal America – suggest that underlying such fierce 
partisan debates is a relatively consistent cross-cultural belief that wealth should be more equally 
distributed than is currently the case.  
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Footnotes 
1 Note that the distribution provided to respondents in the study differs slightly to that shown in 
the Results (Figure 1). This is because at the time of data collection, we did not have access to 
the most recent figures. 
2 To ensure that respondents’ estimates and ideals were always perfectly descending, with the 
top quintile always owning the most wealth and the poorest quintile owning the least, we ordered 
the values provided by respondents from highest to lowest. 
3 In Group 3 we note that the overwhelming majority (91%) listed their political affiliation as 
“none”. As such, this group likely reflects centrist or independent voters.  
4 We report standardized regression coefficients in all analyses.    
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Table 1. Demographic profile of respondents (N=998). 
Party Identification* 
ALP/Greens/Democrats (n=327) 
Liberal/National (n=246) 
Other/unaffiliated (n=422) 
Geographic Location Metro (n=701) 
Regional (n=297) 
Gender Female (n=495) 
Male (n=503) 
Age 
 
18-24 (n=176) 
25-34 (n=214) 
35-44 (n=205) 
45-54 (n=213) 
55+ (n=190) 
*Three respondents did not report party identification; as such, for this variable, N=995. 
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Table 2. Estimates of minimum wage and support for raising the minimum wage. 
Demographic 
category 
Level within category Mean estimate 
of current 
minimum 
wage (AUD$) 
Mean level of 
support for 
raising the 
minimum wage* 
Mean level 
of support 
for 
government 
intervention 
in 
addressing 
wealth 
inequality*  
Party 
identification 
ALP/Greens/Democrats 
(n=327) 
17.01a 5.95a 5.47a 
Liberal/National 
(n=246) 
17.22a 5.40c 4.36c 
Other/unaffiliated 
(n=422) 
16.37a 5.74b 4.95b 
Gender 
Female (n=495) 16.47a 5.93a 4.89a 
Male (n=503) 17.13b 5.52b 5.06a 
Age 
18-24 (n=176) 17.44a 5.61a 4.83a 
25-34 (n=214) 16.55a 5.65a 4.88a 
35-44 (n=205) 16.67a 5.83a 5.09a 
45-54 (n=213) 16.45a  5.87a 5.10a 
55+ (n=190) 17.01a 5.64a 4.96a 
Overall  16.80 5.73 4.98 
Note: Within each demographic category, for each variable, mean estimates with a different 
subscript significantly differ from one another, p<.05.  
* Measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly approve)
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Figure 1. Actual, estimated and ideal wealth distributions by quintile in Australia and the US; US data from Norton and Ariely (2011). 
 
Note: Because of their small percentage share of total wealth, both the “4th 20%” value (0.2%) and the “Bottom 20%” value (0.1%) are not 
visible in the “Actual” US distribution.  
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Figure 2. The actual Australian wealth distribution plotted against the estimated and ideal distributions of respondents of different income levels 
and political affiliations. 
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Figure 2a. Preferences for actual Australian wealth distribution vs. US respondents’ ideal society 
vs. fully equal society. Pie charts depict the percentage of wealth possessed by each quintile; for 
instance, in Australia, the top wealth quintile owns 61% of the total wealth, the second highest 
21%, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Preferences for actual Australian vs. actual US wealth distributions. Pie charts depict 
the percentage of wealth possessed by each quintile; for instance, in Australia, the top wealth 
quintile owns 61% of the total wealth, the second highest 21%, and so on 
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